Bertrand Russell observes that the state is the largest organization one is an involuntary member of. Indeed, it has become a crucial structure on the global stage of power struggles. This observation raises fundamental questions about the nature and legitimacy of statehood itself. Is it defined by geographical boundaries, language, skin color, political ideology? Or is it something simpler? Could the concept of the state be merely a tool for a privileged cohort of elite power brokers to exercise control?
It may be some, all, or none of these things. In the 16th century, the Peace of Westphalia established the terms and conditions (within the European continent, at least) for what we know as a “state” today. The outcomes of this meeting weren’t romantic.
The plain reality is that the “state” as we know it is a structure created by men ordained with powers to do so. Nothing more. In their learned deliberations and meetings, these men smoked pipes, chewed tobacco, and sipped stiff drinks over documents that outlined new rules and guidelines. These rules would govern broad entities or bodies of people who fell within certain geographic boundaries. It became the yardstick for addressing and interpreting actions by peoples who fell within those areas.
The Chinese perspective presents a fascinating contrast to this model. Their understanding conformed to a different structure, established by different men of power. The name the Chinese use for their own “area” is telling of their understanding. China in Chinese is “Zhong Guo,” or “Central Kingdom.” This term was defined, traditionally at least, by the extent of the power of the “Zhong Hua,” the “central flourishing.” In basic terms, the nearer one was to the center of power of the Zhong Guo, the more enlightened, sophisticated, and refined one was. Each concentric circle emanating outward from the Zhong Hua enjoyed progressively less refinement and sophistication until reaching barbarian status. The structure created by powerful people in China’s history had no fixed boundary—a fundamentally different concept of statehood.
Yet today, if you look at a western map, you wouldn’t be surprised to see that China has defined borders. The states that border China, more or less, also desire to uphold the world (western?) view of statehood as depicted on western maps and created in the Treaty of Westphalia. China currently has border or territorial disputes with nearly all, if not all, of its geographic neighbors. Given China’s historical conception of statehood, it’s not hard to see how this situation might arise.
What happens next will be telling of the agency of political power brokers in China, measured against those who wish to retain the structural power and control of existing Westphalia-based state narratives.
If China can wrestle control over this structure, Chinese power brokers will be able to expand their influence by establishing an internationally recognized framework that is historically and culturally Chinese in nature. These power brokers would then be able to “legitimately” seize control over territories on their borders, expanding Chinese economic power, population base, and, ideally, international political influence.
Consider Taiwan: it’s not hard to see how the territory represents far more of a power play to brokers in both East and West than may initially meet the eye.
But to return to our original point: what is the state? Is it a natural concept? Or is it just a tool, used by power brokers to exert structural power over potential adversaries? There is definitely a case for this view, and certainly those who think as much.
Yet the state, in the western sense of a loose association of peoples living within defined geographic boundaries, is generally considered a profitable place to be, participate in, and belong to. Otherwise, they likely wouldn’t still exist 500 years later. If popular sentiment truly opposed the state, uprisings, revolts, and revolutions would probably have scrubbed the concept from the power map and replaced it with another structure. But that, generally speaking, hasn’t happened—at least not yet.
Yes, there are definitely riots, uprisings, and revolutions that result in changes in government or administration style, but these are changes of degree rather than kind. The state, as a structure of power, will likely remain for the foreseeable future.
This doesn’t make it “natural.” Far from it. The concept of the state exists only in the minds of people. There is no tangible way of seeing a state as one flies over Earth. It is purely a mental construct.
There are probably more valid arguments for the legitimacy and naturalness of a “nation-state,” where the entirety of a state’s population falls within a specific ethnic, linguistic, or cultural group. But with the industrialization and commercialization of global economies, transport, and migration, true nation-states probably don’t exist anymore—except in the most far-flung, remote, and probably undeveloped (read: powerless) corners of the globe.
Here’s what I think:
While Western powers remain the dominant brokers in the world, the Westphalian concept of statehood is likely to persist, be reinforced, and reproduce itself. The concept will feed into and bleed into cultural norms around the Western world and, by extension, the rest of the world—which must submit to this orthodoxy to gain access to economic markets (thereby growing their own domestic power).
So while the West remains dominant, the state as we know it will remain a cultural norm. But it is open to change, and change is a constant throughout history.
I personally have no idea what might replace the state. But such replacement is likely to happen someday. And the new unnatural structural beast, however it manifests, will no doubt be the plaything of some new power-broking elite.
Bertrand Russell observes that the state is the largest organization one is an involuntary member of. Indeed, it has become a crucial structure on the global stage of power struggles. This observation raises fundamental questions about the nature and legitimacy of statehood itself. Is it defined by geographical boundaries, language, skin color, political ideology? Or is it something simpler? Could the concept of the state be merely a tool for a privileged cohort of elite power brokers to exercise control?
It may be some, all, or none of these things. In the 16th century, the Peace of Westphalia established the terms and conditions (within the European continent, at least) for what we know as a “state” today. The outcomes of this meeting weren’t romantic.
The plain reality is that the “state” as we know it is a structure created by men ordained with powers to do so. Nothing more. In their learned deliberations and meetings, these men smoked pipes, chewed tobacco, and sipped stiff drinks over documents that outlined new rules and guidelines. These rules would govern broad entities or bodies of people who fell within certain geographic boundaries. It became the yardstick for addressing and interpreting actions by peoples who fell within those areas.
The Chinese perspective presents a fascinating contrast to this model. Their understanding conformed to a different structure, established by different men of power. The name the Chinese use for their own “area” is telling of their understanding. China in Chinese is “Zhong Guo,” or “Central Kingdom.” This term was defined, traditionally at least, by the extent of the power of the “Zhong Hua,” the “central flourishing.” In basic terms, the nearer one was to the center of power of the Zhong Guo, the more enlightened, sophisticated, and refined one was. Each concentric circle emanating outward from the Zhong Hua enjoyed progressively less refinement and sophistication until reaching barbarian status. The structure created by powerful people in China’s history had no fixed boundary—a fundamentally different concept of statehood.
Yet today, if you look at a western map, you wouldn’t be surprised to see that China has defined borders. The states that border China, more or less, also desire to uphold the world (western?) view of statehood as depicted on western maps and created in the Treaty of Westphalia. China currently has border or territorial disputes with nearly all, if not all, of its geographic neighbors. Given China’s historical conception of statehood, it’s not hard to see how this situation might arise.
What happens next will be telling of the agency of political power brokers in China, measured against those who wish to retain the structural power and control of existing Westphalia-based state narratives.
If China can wrestle control over this structure, Chinese power brokers will be able to expand their influence by establishing an internationally recognized framework that is historically and culturally Chinese in nature. These power brokers would then be able to “legitimately” seize control over territories on their borders, expanding Chinese economic power, population base, and, ideally, international political influence.
Consider Taiwan: it’s not hard to see how the territory represents far more of a power play to brokers in both East and West than may initially meet the eye.
But to return to our original point: what is the state? Is it a natural concept? Or is it just a tool, used by power brokers to exert structural power over potential adversaries? There is definitely a case for this view, and certainly those who think as much.
Yet the state, in the western sense of a loose association of peoples living within defined geographic boundaries, is generally considered a profitable place to be, participate in, and belong to. Otherwise, they likely wouldn’t still exist 500 years later. If popular sentiment truly opposed the state, uprisings, revolts, and revolutions would probably have scrubbed the concept from the power map and replaced it with another structure. But that, generally speaking, hasn’t happened—at least not yet.
Yes, there are definitely riots, uprisings, and revolutions that result in changes in government or administration style, but these are changes of degree rather than kind. The state, as a structure of power, will likely remain for the foreseeable future.
This doesn’t make it “natural.” Far from it. The concept of the state exists only in the minds of people. There is no tangible way of seeing a state as one flies over Earth. It is purely a mental construct.
There are probably more valid arguments for the legitimacy and naturalness of a “nation-state,” where the entirety of a state’s population falls within a specific ethnic, linguistic, or cultural group. But with the industrialization and commercialization of global economies, transport, and migration, true nation-states probably don’t exist anymore—except in the most far-flung, remote, and probably undeveloped (read: powerless) corners of the globe.
Here’s what I think:
While Western powers remain the dominant brokers in the world, the Westphalian concept of statehood is likely to persist, be reinforced, and reproduce itself. The concept will feed into and bleed into cultural norms around the Western world and, by extension, the rest of the world—which must submit to this orthodoxy to gain access to economic markets (thereby growing their own domestic power).
So while the West remains dominant, the state as we know it will remain a cultural norm. But it is open to change, and change is a constant throughout history.
I personally have no idea what might replace the state. But such replacement is likely to happen someday. And the new unnatural structural beast, however it manifests, will no doubt be the plaything of some new power-broking elite.
Photographer and cULTURE VULTure 
Leave a comment